Full Rank Solutions for the MIMO Gaussian Wiretap Channel with an
  Average Power Constraint by Fakoorian, S. Ali A. & Swindlehurst, A. Lee
1Full Rank Solutions for the MIMO Gaussian
Wiretap Channel with an Average Power
Constraint
S. Ali. A. Fakoorian, Student Member, IEEE and A. Lee Swindlehurst, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract
This paper considers a multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) Gaussian wiretap channel model,
where there exists a transmitter, a legitimate receiver and an eavesdropper, each equipped with multiple
antennas. In this paper, we first revisit the rank property of the optimal input covariance matrix that
achieves the secrecy capacity of the multiple antenna MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel under the average
power constraint. Next, we obtain necessary and sufficient conditions on the MIMO wiretap channel
parameters such that the optimal input covariance matrix is full-rank, and we fully characterize the
resulting covariance matrix as well. Numerical results are presented to illustrate the proposed theoretical
findings.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
The broadcast nature of a wireless medium makes it very susceptible to eavesdropping, where the
transmitted message is decoded by unintended receiver(s). Recent information-theoretic research on
secure communication has focused on enhancing security at the physical layer. The wiretap channel,
first introduced and studied by Wyner [1], is the most basic physical layer model that captures the
problem of communication security. Wyner showed that when an eavesdropper’s channel is a degraded
version of the main channel, the source and destination can achieve a positive secrecy rate, while ensuring
that the eavesdropper gets zero bits of information. The maximum secrecy rate from the source to the
destination is defined as the secrecy capacity. The Gaussian wiretap channel, in which the outputs at the
legitimate receiver and at the eavesdropper are corrupted by additive white Gaussian noise, was studied
in [2].
Determining the secrecy capacity of a Gaussian wiretap channel is in general a difficult non-convex
optimization problem, and has been addressed independently in [3]-[9]. Oggier and Hassibi [3] and Khisti
and Wornell [4] followed an indirect approach using a Sato-like argument and matrix analysis tools. They
considered the problem of finding the secrecy capacity of the Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel under
the average total power constraint, and a closed-form expression for the secrecy capacity in the high
signal-to-noise-ratio (SNR) regime was obtained in [4]. In [5], the rank property of the optimal input
covariance matrix for the secrecy rate maximization problem is discussed but the authors were unable
to characterize the solution for the general case. For some special cases of the MIMO wiretap channel,
where the solution has rank one, the optimal input covariance matrix that achieves the secrecy capacity
under the average total power constraint was obtained in [5]-[7].
In [8], Liu and Shamai propose a more information-theoretic approach using the enhancement concept,
originally presented by Weingarten et al. [10], as a tool for the characterization of the MIMO Gaussian
broadcast channel capacity. Liu and Shamai have shown that an enhanced degraded version of the channel
attains the same secrecy capacity as does a Gaussian input distribution. From the mathematical solution
in [8] it was evident that such an enhanced channel exists; however it was not clear how to construct such
a channel until the work of [9], which provided a closed-form expression for the secrecy capacity under
a covariance matrix power constraint. While this result is interesting since the expression for the secrecy
capacity is valid for all SNR scenarios, there still exists no computable secrecy capacity expression for
the MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel under an average total power constraint.
In this paper, we first investigate the rank property of the optimal input covariance matrix that achieves
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3the secrecy capacity of the general Gaussian multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) wiretap channel
under the average total power constraint, where the number of antennas is arbitrary for both the transmitter
and the two receivers. Next, we obtain the optimal input covariance matrix for the case that this optimal
covariance matrix is full-rank. Necessary and sufficient conditions to have a full-rank optimal input
covariance matrix are characterized as well.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe the assumed mathematical
model and revisit the current solution for the wiretap channel under the matrix power constraint. The
rank property of the optimal input covariance matrix under the average power constraint is investigated
in Section III, and in Section IV we characterize the conditions under which the input covariance matrix
that achieves the secrecy capacity of a wiretap channel under the average power constraint is full-rank.
In Section V, we discuss some interesting facts regarding the optimal solution, and in Section VI we
present numerical results to illustrate the proposed solutions. Finally, Section VII concludes the paper.
Notation: Vector-valued random variables are written with non-boldface uppercase letters (e.g., X),
while the corresponding non-boldface lowercase letter (x) denotes a specific realization of the random
variable. Scalar variables are written with non-boldface (lowercase or uppercase) letters. The Hermtian
(i.e., conjugate) transpose is denoted by (.)H , the matrix trace by Tr(.), and I indicates an identity
matrix. Inequality A  B means that A−B is Hermitian positive semi-definite. The Euclidean norm of
the vector x is written as ‖x‖. Mutual information between the random variables A and B is denoted
by I(A;B), E is the expectation operator, and CN (0, σ2) represents the complex circularly symmetric
Gaussian distribution with zero mean and variance σ2.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PRIOR WORKS
We begin with a multiple-antenna wiretap channel with nt transmit antennas and nr and ne receive
antennas at the legitimate recipient and the eavesdropper, respectively:
yr = Hx + zr
ye = Gx + ze
(1)
where x is a zero-mean nt × 1 transmitted signal vector, zr ∈ Cnr×1 and ze ∈ Cne×1 are additive
white Gaussian noise vectors at the receiver and eavesdropper, respectively, with i.i.d. entries distributed
as CN (0, 1). The matrices H ∈ Cnr×nt and G ∈ Cne×nt represent the channels associated with the
receiver and the eavesdropper, respectively. Similar to other papers considering the perfect secrecy rate
of the wiretap channel, we assume that the transmitter has perfect channel state information (CSI) for
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4both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper. For the Gaussian channel, where Gaussian inputs are
an optimal choice, the secrecy capacity is given by [3]
Csec = max
x
[I(X;Yr)− I(X;Ye)] = max
Q0
¯
R(Q) (2)
where R(Q) = log |HQHH + I| − log |GQGH + I|, and Q = E{xxH} is the input covariance matrix.
In [9], the above secret communication problem was analyzed under the matrix power-covariance
constraint, defined as
Q  S (3)
where S is a positive semi-definite matrix. An explicit expression for the secrecy capacity under (3) was
obtained via applying the generalized eigenvalue decomposition to the following two positive definite
matrices
(S
1
2HHHS
1
2 + I , S
1
2GHGS
1
2 + I) (4)
In particular, there exists an invertible generalized eigenvector matrix C such that [14]
CH
[
S
1
2GHGS
1
2 + I
]
C = I (5)
CH
[
S
1
2HHHS
1
2 + I
]
C = Λ (6)
where Λ = diag{λ1, ..., λnt} is a positive definite diagonal matrix and λ1, ..., λnt represent the generalized
eigenvalues. Without loss of generality, we assume the eigenvalues are ordered as
λ1 ≥ ... ≥ λb > 1 ≥ λb+1 ≥ ... ≥ λnt > 0
so that a total of b (0 ≤ b ≤ nt) are greater than 1. Hence, we can write Λ as
Λ =
 Λ1 0¯
0
¯
Λ2
 (7)
where Λ1 = diag{λ1, ..., λb} and Λ2 = diag{λb+1, ..., λnt}. We can partition C similarly:
C = [C1 C2] (8)
where C1 is the nt× b submatrix representing the generalized eigenvectors corresponding to {λ1, ..., λb}
and C2 is the nt × (nt − b) submatrix representing the generalized eigenvectors corresponding to
{λb+1, ..., λnt}. Using the above notation, the secrecy capacity of the MIMO wiretap channel under
the matrix power constraint (3) can be expressed as [9], [13, Theorem 3]:
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5Corollary 1. Under the matrix power constraint (3), the secrecy capacity of the MIMO Gaussian wiretap
channel is given by
Csec(S) =
b∑
i=1
log λi = log |Λ1| (9)
where the optimal input covariance matrix Q∗S that maximizes (2) and attains (9) is given by
Q∗S = S
1
2C
 (CH1 C1)−1 0¯
0
¯
0
¯
CHS 12 . (10)
Remark 1. From (5) and (6), one can easily confirm that if HHH  GHG, then for any S  0
¯
we
have Λ  I. In other words, in this case the pencil in (4) has no generalized eigenvalue bigger than 1.
Thus, Csec(S) = 0 for any S  0¯.
In this paper, we consider the secrecy capacity problem in (2) under the average power constraint:
Tr(E{xxH}) = Tr(Q) ≤ Pt. (11)
For this constraint, no computable secrecy capacity expression has been derived to date for the general
MIMO case. In principle, one would have to find the secrecy capacity through an exhaustive search over
the set {S : S  0
¯
,Tr(S) ≤ P} [10, Lemma 1], [13]:
Csec(Pt) = max
S0
¯
,Tr(S)=Pt
Csec(S) . (12)
where for any given semidefinite S, Csec(S) should be computed as given by (9).
In the next section, we investigate the rank of the optimal input covariance matrix Q∗ that attains
Csec(Pt). Next, in Section IV, we obtain the optimal Q∗ under the average power constraint for the case
that Q∗ is full-rank.
III. RANK PROPERTY OF THE OPTIMAL SOLUTION UNDER AN AVERAGE POWER CONSTRAINT
First, we note that the problem under Tr(Q) ≤ Pt is equivalent to that under Tr(Q) = Pt [3], [5]1.
Also note that in (12), this implies that we have Tr(S) = Pt instead of Tr(S) ≤ Pt.
We are interested in finding the optimal Ŝ which maximizes the problem (12). Let us assume that
we have found the optimal Ŝ. Consequently, from (10), the optimal input covariance matrix that attains
1For this statement, and also for the following results in the paper, we exclude the special case HHH  GHG for which
the Csec is trivially 0 for any S  0
¯
, and consequently for any Pt, as pointed out in Remark 1.
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6Csec(Pt) is given by
Q∗ = Ŝ
1
2 Ĉ
 (ĈH1 Ĉ1)−1 0¯
0
¯
0
¯
 ĈH Ŝ 12 , (13)
where Ĉ and Ĉ1 have respectively the same definitions as those of C and C1, given by (5)-(8), but here
for the pencil (Ŝ
1
2HHHŜ
1
2 + I , Ŝ
1
2GHGŜ
1
2 + I). Note that Q∗ can be rewritten as
Q∗ = Ŝ
1
2
[
Ĉ1 Ĉ2
] (ĈH1 Ĉ1)−1 0¯
0
¯
0
¯
 ĈH1
ĈH2
 Ŝ 12
= Ŝ
1
2 Ĉ1(Ĉ
H
1 Ĉ1)
−1ĈH1 Ŝ
1
2
= Ŝ
1
2 PĈ1 Ŝ
1
2 (14)
where PĈ1 = Ĉ1(Ĉ
H
1 Ĉ1)
−1ĈH1 is the projection matrix onto the space of Ĉ1. Moreover, let P⊥Ĉ1 =
I−PĈ1 be the projection onto the space orthogonal to Ĉ1. We have
Tr(Q∗) = Tr(Ŝ
1
2 PĈ1 Ŝ
1
2 )
= Tr(Ŝ PĈ1) (15)
= Tr(Ŝ PĈ1PĈ1) (16)
= Tr(PĈ1Ŝ PĈ1) (17)
where (15) comes from the fact that Tr(AB) = Tr(BA), and (16) is because PĈ1 = PĈ1PĈ1 . Similarly
we have
Tr(Ŝ) = Tr
(
(PĈ1 + P
⊥
Ĉ1
) Ŝ (PĈ1 + P
⊥
Ĉ1
)
)
= Tr(PĈ1 Ŝ PĈ1) + Tr(P
⊥
Ĉ1
Ŝ P⊥
Ĉ1
) (18)
= Tr(Q∗
Ŝ
) + Tr(P⊥
Ĉ1
Ŝ P⊥
Ĉ1
) (19)
where (19) results from (17).
Lemma 1. For the optimal Ŝ, we have span{Ĉ1} = span{Ŝ}.
Proof: : The proof is obtained using (19), and by noting that for the optimal Ŝ we must have
Tr(Ŝ) = Tr(Q∗) = Pt. This means that we must have Tr(P⊥Ĉ1 Ŝ P
⊥
Ĉ1
) = 0, or equivalently P⊥
Ĉ1
Ŝ = 0
¯
,
which completes the proof.
Using Lemma 1 in (14) we have
Q∗ = Ŝ. (20)
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7The following lemma reveals another property of the optimal input covariance matrix under the average
power constraint.
Lemma 2. For the optimal Ŝ, i.e. Q∗, the pencil (Ŝ
1
2HHHŜ
1
2 + I , Ŝ
1
2GHGŜ
1
2 + I) has no generalized
eigenvalue less than one:
ĈH
[
Ŝ
1
2HHHŜ
1
2 + I
]
Ĉ =
 Λ̂1 0¯
0
¯
I
 (21)
ĈH
[
Ŝ
1
2GHGŜ
1
2 + I
]
Ĉ =
 I 0¯
0
¯
I
 (22)
where Λ̂2 = I corresponds to the generalized eigenvalues equal to one.
Proof: We note that any vector which lies in the null space of Ŝ can be a generalized eigenvector
of the pencil (Ŝ
1
2HHHŜ
1
2 + I , Ŝ
1
2GHGŜ
1
2 + I), with a generalized eigenvalue equal to 1. Such
vectors span the null space of Ŝ, i.e., span{Ĉ2} = span{Ŝ}⊥. On the other hand, from Lemma 1,
span{Ĉ1} = span{Ŝ}. Thus for the optimal Ŝ, all generalized eigenvectors of the pencil (Ŝ 12HHHŜ 12 +
I , Ŝ
1
2GHGŜ
1
2 + I) correspond to generalized eigenvalues either bigger than or equal to 1.
Let b denote number of generalized eigenvalues of the pencil (Ŝ
1
2HHHŜ
1
2 + I , Ŝ
1
2GHGŜ
1
2 + I)
that are strictly bigger than 1, where again Ŝ = Q∗ represents the optimal input covariance matrix that
attains the secrecy capacity under the average power constraint given by (11). From Lemma 1, we have
rank(Q∗) = rank(Ĉ1) = b.
Theorem 1. For the optimal Q∗ we have
rank(Q∗) ≤ m (23)
where m is the number of positive eigenvalues of the matrix HHH−GHG.
Proof: Subtracting (22) from (21), a straightforward computation yields
Ŝ
1
2
[
HHH−GHG] Ŝ 12 = Ĉ−H
 Λ̂1 − I 0¯
0
¯
0
¯
 Ĉ−1  0
¯
. (24)
From (24), we note that Ŝ
1
2
[
HHH−GHG] Ŝ 12  0
¯
, from which it follows that rank(Q∗) ≤ m.
Remark 2. From Theorem 1, one can easily confirm that the optimal Q∗ can be full rank only in the case
that m = nt, i.e. HHH  GHG. For all other scenarios, the optimal Q∗ will be low rank. The authors
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8of [3], [5] use the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions on problem (2) to make a similar statement,
but they do not show what the rank of the optimal Q∗ will be.
The following lemma will be used for the computations in the next section.
Lemma 3. For the case of HHH  GHG, for any nt×nt matrix S  0¯, all the generalized eigenvalues
of the pencil (S
1
2HHHS
1
2 + I , S
1
2GHGS
1
2 + I) are strictly bigger than 1, i.e. Λ  I, iff S is full rank,
i.e. S  0
¯
.
Proof: The claim is easily proved by considering the rank of both sides of (24).
IV. CHARACTERIZATION OF THE OPTIMAL FULL-RANK SOLUTION
In this section, we characterize the secrecy capacity under the average power constraint for a particular
class of MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel where the optimal solution Q∗ is full rank. While necessary
conditions for a full-rank Q∗ were characterized in the previous section, here we derive sufficient
conditions as well.
We begin by rewriting problem (2) here:
Csec(Pt) = max
Q0
¯
, Tr(Q)=Pt
log |HQHH + I| − log |GQGH + I| . (25)
The Lagrangian associated with this problem is given by
L = log |HQHH + I| − log |GQGH + I| − µ(Tr(Q)− Pt) + Tr(MQ) (26)
where µ > 0 and M  0
¯
are the Lagrange multipliers. The optimal Q∗ must satisfy the following KKT
conditions:
HH(HQ∗HH + I)−1H−GH(GQ∗GH + I)−1G = µI−M (27)
µ(Tr(Q∗)− Pt) = 0 (28)
Q∗M = MQ∗ = 0
¯
. (29)
Using the matrix inversion lemma [14], (27) can be written as
(HHHQ∗ + I)−1HHH−GHG(Q∗GHG + I)−1 = µI−M . (30)
Left multiplication by (HHHQ∗ + I) and right multiplication by (Q∗GHG + I) of both sides of (30)
yields
HHH−GHG = µ (HHHQ∗ + I) (Q∗GHG + I)−M (31)
= µ (GHGQ∗ + I) (Q∗HHH + I)−M , (32)
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9where in obtaining (31) we have used the KKT condition (29), and Eq. (32) comes from the fact that (31)
is Hermitian.
We are considering problem (25) for the case that HHH − GHG is strictly positive definite, i.e.
HHH  GHG, since this is the necessary condition for having a full rank optimal Q∗. As we characterize
the full rank Q∗, the sufficient conditions are revealed as well.
Remark 3. By following exactly the same steps as in the proof of [3, Proposition 5], one can easily
show that for the case of HHH  GHG, the optimization problem (25) is convex2 in Q.
Thus for the case of interest, the KKT conditions (28), (29) and (31) are necessary and sufficient
conditions for the optimality of Q∗. In other words, any Q  0
¯
that satisfies those conditions is an
optimal solution for the problem (25). By the KKT condition (29), a full rank Q∗ follows that M = 0
¯
.
Thus, (31) and (32) simplify to
HHH−GHG = µ (HHHQ∗ + I) (Q∗GHG + I) (33)
= µ (GHGQ∗ + I) (Q∗HHH + I) . (34)
Lemma 4. Let the diagonal matrix D and the unitary matrix Φs¯ respectively denote the eigenvalue and
eigenvector matrices of (S¯
1
2GHGS¯
1
2 + I), where we set S¯ = (HHH−GHG)−1:
(S¯
1
2GHGS¯
1
2 + I) = Φs¯ D Φ
H
s¯ . (35)
Then we have
HHH = S¯−
1
2 Φs¯ D Φ
H
s¯ S¯
− 1
2 (36)
GHG = S¯−
1
2 Φs¯ (D− I) ΦHs¯ S¯−
1
2 . (37)
Proof: Eq. (37) comes directly from (35). Please refer to Appendix A for details on obtaining (36).
Using (36) and (37) in (33), after some simplification we have
S¯−
1
2 Φs¯ Φ
H
s¯ S¯
− 1
2 = µ (S¯−
1
2 Φs¯ D Φ
H
s¯ S¯
− 1
2 Q∗ + I) (Q∗ S¯−
1
2 Φs¯ (D− I) ΦHs¯ S¯−
1
2 + I)
= µ S¯−
1
2 Φs¯ (D Φ
H
s¯ S¯
− 1
2 Q∗ + ΦHs¯ S¯
1
2 ) (Q∗ S¯−
1
2 Φs¯ (D− I) + S¯ 12 Φs¯) ΦHs¯ S¯−
1
2
= µ S¯−
1
2 Φs¯ (D W + I) Φ
H
s¯ S¯Φs¯ (W(D− I) + I) ΦHs¯ S¯−
1
2 , (38)
2In fact, the optimization problem (25) is convex in Q when HHH  GHG.
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where in (38) we defined
W = ΦHs¯ S¯
− 1
2 Q∗S¯−
1
2Φs¯ . (39)
From (38), we get
I = µ (D W + I) ΦHs¯ S¯Φs¯ (W(D− I) + I) . (40)
Let X  0
¯
and Y  0
¯
be two diagonal matrices, which will be defined soon. Left multiplication by
X and right multiplication by Y of both sides of (40) gives
XY = µ (XD W + X) ΦHs¯ S¯Φs¯ (W(D− I)Y + Y) . (41)
We find X and Y by solving the following set of equations
XY = I
XD = (D− I)Y
(42)
which results in
X = Y−1 =
(
I−D−1) 12 . (43)
Substituting (43) into (41), we have
I = µ (XD W + X) ΦHs¯ S¯Φs¯
(
W DX + X−1
)
= µ
(
XD W DX + X2D
)
X−1D−1ΦHs¯ S¯Φs¯D
−1X−1 (XD W DX + D)
= µ (XD W DX + (D− I)) X−1D−1ΦHs¯ S¯Φs¯D−1X−1 (XD W DX + D) . (44)
where we have used (43) in obtaining (44).
Using an approach similar to what we used to obtain (44) from (33), one can show that3
I = µ (XD W DX + D) X−1D−1ΦHs¯ S¯Φs¯D
−1X−1 (XD W DX + (D− I)) . (45)
Define K as
K = XD W DX =
(
I−D−1) 12 D W D (I−D−1) 12 , (46)
where D and W are respectively given by (35) and (39). Moreover, let
Σ¯ = X−1D−1ΦHs¯ S¯Φs¯D
−1X−1 =
(
I−D−1)− 12 D−1ΦHs¯ S¯Φs¯D−1 (I−D−1)− 12 . (47)
3Clearly (45) is also trivially obtained from (44).
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Using (46) and (47) in (44) and (45), we have
I = µ (K + D) Σ¯ (K + (D− I))
= µ (K + (D− I)) Σ¯ (K + D) .
(48)
We note from (48) that
µ Σ¯ = (K + D)−1 (K + (D− I))−1 = (K + (D− I))−1 (K + D)−1 . (49)
This result implies that, for the optimal Q∗, (K + (D − I))−1, (K + D)−1 and Σ¯ commute and have
the same eigenvectors [14].
Denote the eigenvalue decomposition of Σ¯ as
Σ¯ = U Ω UH . (50)
Based on the argument made after (49), we have
K + (D− I) = U Λ1 UH
K + D = U Λ2 U
H ,
(51)
where one can easily confirm that Λ2 = Λ1 + I. By replacing (50) and (51) in (48), and noting that
UHU = UUH = I, and that Λ1, Λ2 and Ω are all diagonal, we have
I = µUΛ1 Ω Λ2U
H = µΛ1 Ω Λ2 = µ (Λ
2
1 + Λ1) Ω . (52)
Recall that the unknown parameters in (52) are the diagonal matrix Λ1 and the scalar µ > 0. Let λi1
and ωi denote the ith diagonal element of Λ1 and Ω, respectively. From (52), we can solve for λi1 and
obtain
λi1 =
1
2
(
−1 +
√
1 +
4
µωi
)
, (53)
where the Lagrange multiplier µ > 0 is chosen to satisfy the power constraint Tr(Q∗) = Pt, as will be
explained below.
Theorem 2. The optimal full-rank input covariance matrix that attains the secrecy capacity for the average
power constraint is given by
Q∗ = S¯
1
2Φs¯
(
I−D−1)− 12 D−1 (UΛ1UH + I−D)D−1 (I−D−1)− 12 ΦHs¯ S¯ 12 (54)
iff
• HHH−GHG  0
¯
, and
October 18, 2012 DRAFT
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• for the given Pt,
UΛ1U
H  D− I (55)
where Λ1 is given by (53).
Proof: The proof is obtained by obtaining K from (51), and substituting it back into (46) and (39)
via straightforward computations.
To fully characterize Q∗, one must obtain the Lagrange multiplier µ > 0 such that Tr(Q∗) = Pt. As
(53) shows, Tr(Q∗) is monotonically decreasing with µ:
lim
µ→0
Tr(Q∗) =∞, and lim
µ→∞Tr(Q
∗) = −Tr(S¯ 12Φs¯D−1ΦHs¯ S¯
1
2 ) < 0 .
Thus for any transmit power Pt, there exists a Lagrange multiplier µ > 0 for which Tr(Q∗) = Pt. The
appropriate value of µ can be easily found using, for example, the bisection method.
Note that Theorem 2 also reveals the necessary and sufficient conditions for having a full rank optimal
Q∗. While for any transmit power Pt one can find a Lagrange multiplier µ > 0 for which Tr(Q∗) = Pt
and UΛ1UH  0¯, to have a full rank Q
∗, (55) must be satisfied. Also recall from (74) that D− I  0
¯
.
The flowchart in Fig. 1 summarizes the steps required to calculate the optimal full-rank Q∗ for the case
of HHH−GHG  0
¯
.
Remark 4. By replacing Q∗ given by (54) into (25), the optimal input covariance matrix Q∗ given by
Theorem 2 attains the secrecy capacity
Csec(Pt) = log |Λ1| − log |Λ1 + I|+ log |D| − log |D− I|
= log |I− (Λ1 + I)−1|+ log |I + (D− I)−1| , (56)
where Λ1 and D are diagonal matrices, respectively given by (53) and (35). Note that while both log
terms in (56) return non-negative values, the first term depends on both the channels and the power Pt,
while the second term just depends on the channels (see Lemma 5).
In the following we show that for the case of HHH − GHG  0
¯
, i.e. when at least one of the
eigenvalues of HHH−GHG is zero, there exists an equivalent wiretap channel with the same secrecy
capacity of the original wiretap channel. For this case, the secrecy capacity is characterized too.
Theorem 3. For the MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel defined by direct and cross channels H and G
respectively, with HHH−GHG  0
¯
, there exists an equivalent wiretap channel with Heq and Geq such
that HHeqHeq −GHeqGeq  0¯, and Csec(H,G, Pt) = Csec(Heq,Geq, Pt).
October 18, 2012 DRAFT
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H, G, Pt
Step 1: Create S¯
S¯ = (HHH−GHG)−1
Step 2: Calculate Φs¯ and D from (35)
[Φs¯ , D] = eig(S¯
1
2 GHGS¯
1
2 + I)
Step 3: Calculate Σ¯ from (47)
Σ¯ =
(
I−D−1)− 12 D−1ΦHs¯ S¯Φs¯D−1 (I−D−1)− 12
Step 4: Calculate U and Ω from (50)
[U , Ω] = eig(Σ¯)
Step 5: Derive Λ1 from (53)
Λ1 =
1
2
(
−I + (I + 4
µ
Ω−1)
1
2
)
Step 6: Calculate Q∗ according to (54)
Q∗ = S¯
1
2 Φs¯D
−1 (I−D−1)− 12 (UΛ1UH + I−D) (I−D−1)− 12 D−1ΦHs¯ S¯ 12
Step 7: Find µ
µ|Tr(Q∗)=Pt
Step 8: Check the validity of Q∗
UΛ1U
H  D − I
Fig. 1: Flowchart for obtaining the optimal full-rank Q∗.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix B for the proof and the characterization of the equivalent channels
Heq and Geq.
Although at this time a proof is unavailable, we conjecture that the secrecy capacity of any general
MIMO wiretap channel is given by an equivalent wiretap channel with Heq and Geq such that HHeqH
H
eq−
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GHeqGeq  0¯, and Csec(H,G, Pt) = Csec(Heq,Geq, Pt). If one cannot find such an equivalent wiretap
channel, the secrecy capacity of the main channel is zero, i.e., Csec(H,G, Pt) = 0. Besides the case of
HHH −GHG  0
¯
, the case for which the optimal input covariance matrix is rank 1 is another case
supporting this conjecture. For the rank 1 case, it is shown in [6] that the optimal input covariance matrix
is given by Q∗ = Pt uuH , where u is the normalized principal eigenvector corresponding to the largest
eigenvalue λ1 of the pencil (I+PtHHH , I+PtGHG). For this case, if λ1 > 1, the secrecy capacity is
Csec(H,G, Pt) = log(λ1), and the equivalent wiretap channel is defined such that hHeqheq = uHHHHu
and gHeqgeq = u
HGHGu.
V. REMARKS REGARDING Q∗
This section discusses some interesting points regarding the optimal solution in (54). For the following
observations, one can assume when required that both conditions for a full-rank Q∗ given in Theorem
(2) are satisfied. Let γi, i = 1, · · · , nt, be the generalized eigenvalues of the pencil (HHH , GHG).
Then from the definition [15], γi = σ2i , where σi is the ith generalized singular value of (H , G).
Lemma 5. The second term in the secrecy capacity expression (56) is only channel dependent and is
equal to
∑nt
i=1 log(σ
2
i ).
Proof: From (72) we have:
HHH S¯
1
2Φs¯ = S¯
− 1
2 Φs¯ D
= GHG S¯
1
2Φs¯ (D− I)−1 D (57)
= GHG S¯
1
2Φs¯
(
I + (D− I)−1) ,
where (57) comes from (73). Thus, from the definition [14], the generalized eigenvalue matrix of
(HHH , GHG) is
(
I + (D− I)−1), which completes the proof.
Note that the definition of singular values here is slightly different from what is given in [4]. Here σi
may be∞, while this is not the case in [4]. More precisely, from (73) for the case of rank(G) = ne < nt,
nt − ne diagonal elements of D are equal to one, as mentioned in Remark 5. The σi corresponding to
di = 1 tends to ∞.
Lemma 6. In the high SNR scenario (Pt →∞) and for the case of rank(G) = nt, the asymptotic form
of the exact secrecy capacity (56) is simply given by
Csec = log |I + (D− I)−1| =
nt∑
i=1
log(σ2i ) . (58)
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Proof: For Pt → ∞, the Lagrange parameter satisfies µ → 0, as mentioned after Theorem 2.
Moreover, for the case of rank(G) = nt, the matrix Σ¯ given by (47) will have finite-valued eigenvalues.
Thus as µ→ 0, the elements of the diagonal matrix Λ1, given by (53), go to∞ (λi1 →∞). Consequently,
the first log term in (56) disappears as Pt →∞.
It is also interesting to consider the optimal solution in (54) for the case that the eavesdropper’s channel
is very weak, e.g. G = 0
¯
. For this specific case, the wiretap channel simplifies to a point-to-point MIMO
Gaussian link, where the optimal input covariance matrix under the average power constraint is known
to be ΦH ( 1µI−Λ−1H )+ ΦHH , and is found via the standard water-filling solution, where unitary ΦH and
diagonal ΛH are obtained from the eigenvalue decomposition HHH = ΦHΛHΦHH .
Lemma 7. For the case of G = 0
¯
, the optimal solution in (54) simplifies to the conventional water-filling
solution, where
Q∗ = ΦH (µ−1I−Λ−1H )+ ΦHH . (59)
Proof: Using (72) and via simple calculations, we note that for any G, Eq. (54) can be rewritten as
Q∗ = S¯
1
2Φs¯
(
I−D−1)− 12 D−1 UΛ1UH D−1 (I−D−1)− 12 ΦHs¯ S¯ 12 − (HHH)−1 . (60)
From (73), when G → 0
¯
then D → I. Next from (72), Φs¯ → ΦH . Using these facts in (47), and after
some straightforward calculations, we have Σ¯ → (D − I)−1D−1Λ−1H = Ω, and U → I in (50). Using
these in (60), we have
Q∗ → ΦH(D− I)−1D−1Λ−1H Λ1ΦHH − (HHH)−1
→ 1
2
ΦH(D− I)−1Λ−1H
(
−I + (I + 4
µ
(D− I) ΛH) 12
)
ΦHH − (HHH)−1
→ 1
µ
I− (HHH)−1 = ΦH (µ−1I−Λ−1H )+ ΦHH , (61)
where in obtaining (61) we used the fact that D→ I when G→ 0
¯
.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In the first example, we consider a MIMO wiretap channel with nt = ne = 2, nt = 3 and channel
matrices given by
H =

0.32− 0.52i 0.83 + 1.15i
0.51− 0.26i 0.06− 0.15i
−0.11 + 0.81i 0.29 + 0.68i
 , (62)
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Fig. 2: Secrecy Capacity versus Pt for nt = ne = 2 and nr = 3. Solid curve represents secrecy capacity
and dotted curve indicates the achievable secrecy rate using a rank-one input covariance matrix.
G =
 0.03− 0.70i −0.32− 0.32i
0.24− 0.11i 1.36 + 0.18i
 , (63)
which satisfy HHH −GHG  0
¯
. Fig. 2 shows the secrecy capacity as a function of transmit power
Pt. For comparison, the figure also depicts the achievable secrecy rate using the input covariance matrix
Q = Pt uu
H , which results to Rsec = log λ1, as shown in [4]-[6]. Note that in this example, the optimal
Q∗ is not full-rank for Pt < 2.8.
In Fig. 3 we consider another example of the case of HHH −GHG  0
¯
, here with nt = ne = 3,
nt = 4 and channel matrices given by
H =

0.89 + 0.54i −0.06 + 0.60i 0.48− 1.11i
0.46 −0.44 + 0.80i −1.07 + 0.63i
1.40− 0.13i 0.17− 0.82i 0.59− 0.31i
0.43− 0.23i 0.03 + 1.35i 0.44− 0.07i
 , (64)
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Fig. 3: Secrecy Capacity versus Pt for nt = ne = 3 and nr = 4. Solid curve represents secrecy capacity
and dotted curve indicates the achievable secrecy rate using a rank-one input covariance matrix.
G =

0.46− 0.59i 0.24− 0.01i −0.37 + 0.15i
0.51− 0.63i 0.58 + 0.51i 0.86− 0.47i
0.17− 0.24i −0.83 + 0.51i 0.04− 0.64i
 . (65)
For this example, the optimal Q∗ is only full-rank for Pt > 0.5.
Finally in Fig. 4, we compare the standard point-to-point capacity without secrecy constraints with
the secrecy capacity given by (56). In this example, Pt = 20, direct channel H is given by (64) but
the cross channel G is assumed to satisfy GHG = αI, where α changes from 0 to 1.95 (note that
HHH−GHG  0
¯
only for α ≤ 1.95). As predicted, the secrecy capacity achieved by the derived Q∗
in (54) approaches the standard capacity as G → 0
¯
. It is interesting to note that even for very small
values of α, the difference between the standard capacity and secrecy capacity is considerable.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we considered the rank property of the optimal input covariance matrix under the average
power constraint for a general MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel, where each node has an arbitrary number
of antennas. We obtained necessary and sufficient constraints on the MIMO wiretap channel parameters
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Fig. 4: Secrecy Capacity versus α for Pt = 20. Solid curve represents secrecy capacity and dashed curve
indicates the point to point capacity.
such that the optimal input covariance matrix is full-rank, and we presented a method for characterizing
the resulting covariance matrix as well.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 4
Define S¯ = (HHH − GHG)−1 and apply the generalized eigenvalue decomposition on the pencil
(S¯
1
2HHHS¯
1
2 + I , S¯
1
2GHGS¯
1
2 + I) to obtain the invertible generalized eigenvector matrix C¯ and the
diagonal generalized eigenvalue matrix Λs¯ as
C¯H
[
S¯
1
2HHHS¯
1
2 + I
]
C¯ = Λs¯ (66)
C¯H
[
S¯
1
2GHGS¯
1
2 + I
]
C¯ = I . (67)
By subtracting (67) from (66), we have
C¯H C¯ = Λs¯ − I . (68)
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Note that from Lemma 3, we have Λs¯ − I  0¯. Thus, C¯ must be of the form [14]
C¯ = Φs¯ (Λs¯ − I) 12 , (69)
where Φs¯ is an unknown unitary matrix. In the following, as we continue the proof, Φs¯ is also charac-
terized.
By replacing (69) in (66) and (67), it is revealed that the unitary matrix Φs¯ represents the common set
of eigenvectors for the matrices S¯
1
2HHHS¯
1
2 + I and S¯
1
2GHGS¯
1
2 + I, and thus both matrices commute.
In particular,
ΦHs¯
[
S¯
1
2HHHS¯
1
2 + I
]
Φs¯ = Λs¯(Λs¯ − I)−1 = I + (Λs¯ − I)−1 (70)
ΦHs¯
[
S¯
1
2GHGS¯
1
2 + I
]
Φs¯ = (Λs¯ − I)−1 . (71)
Defining D = (Λs¯ − I)−1, from (70)-(71) and via straightforward computation, we have
HHH = S¯−
1
2 Φs¯ D Φ
H
s¯ S¯
− 1
2 (72)
GHG = S¯−
1
2 Φs¯ (D− I) ΦHs¯ S¯−
1
2 , (73)
which proves (36) and (37). Substituting (68) in (67), we also have
I = C¯H
[
S¯
1
2GHGS¯
1
2 + I
]
C¯
= C¯H S¯
1
2GHGS¯
1
2 C¯ + Λs¯ − I ,
or equivalently
2I−Λs¯ = C¯H S¯ 12GHGS¯ 12 C¯.
Remark 5. Since C¯H S¯
1
2GHGS¯
1
2 C¯  0
¯
, it results that 2I − Λs¯  0¯. Equivalently, by defining D =
(Λs¯ − I)−1  0¯, we have
I−D−1  0
¯
D− I  0
¯
.
(74)
Note that from (73), if GHG  0
¯
, then D−I  0
¯
and vice versa. As we will observe in Theorem 2, to
have a full-rank optimal input covariance matrix Q∗, having a full-rank GHG is not required. While we
assume throughout the paper and without loss of generality that the diagonal matrix D− I is invertible,
for the case of rank deficient GHG one can follow the calculations in this paper assuming  > 0 for
zero-diagonal elements of D− I and letting  ↓ 0 at the end (see Lemma 7).
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APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
We want to obtain Q∗d, the optimal input covariance matrix that attains the secrecy capacity for the
case of HHH −GHG  0
¯
. We note that rank(HHH −GHG) = m < nt. Hence, from Theorems 1
and 2, Q∗d is rank-deficient.
The right hand side of (25) can be rewritten as
R(Q) = log |I + HHHQ| − log |I + GHGQ|
= log |(I + HHHQ) (I + GHGQ)−1|
= log |I + (HHH−GHG) Q (I + GHGQ)−1| , (75)
where Eq. (75) is obtained from the matrix inversion lemma [14] (I + A)−1 = I−A(I + A)−1. Let the
eigenvalue decomposition of HHH−GHG to be denoted as
HHH−GHG = Ψ
 Λm 0¯
0
¯
0
¯
ΨH , (76)
where Λm  0¯ is a diagonal matrix of size m×m. Using (76) in (75), we have
R(Q) = log
∣∣∣∣∣∣I + Ψ
 Λm 0¯
0
¯
0
¯
ΨH Q (I + GHGQ)−1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
= log
∣∣∣∣∣∣I +
 Λm 0¯
0
¯
0
¯
ΨHQΨ(I + ΨHGHGΨ ΨHQΨ)−1
∣∣∣∣∣∣ , (77)
where in obtaining (77) we have used the facts that ΨHΨ = ΨΨH = I and |I + AB| = |I + BA|.
Define Q¯ = ΨHQΨ and G¯ = GΨ, so that the optimization problem in (25) can be rewritten as
Csec(Pt) = max
Q¯0
¯
, Tr(Q¯)=Pt
R(Q¯) ,
where
R(Q¯) = log
∣∣∣∣∣∣I +
 Λm 0¯
0
¯
0
¯
 Q¯ (I + G¯HG¯ Q¯)−1
∣∣∣∣∣∣ . (78)
From right-hand side of (78), we see that the optimal Q¯ is of the form
Q¯ =
 Q¯m 0¯
0
¯
0
¯
 , (79)
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where Q¯m  0¯ is of size m×m. Write G¯
HG¯ as
G¯HG¯ =
 J1 J2
JH2 J3
 (80)
where J1, J2 and J3 are of dimensions m×m, m× (nt −m) and (nt −m)× (nt −m), respectively.
By substituting (79) and (80) into (78), we obtain
R(Q¯) = log
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣I +
 ΛmQ¯m 0¯
0
¯
0
¯
 I + J1Q¯m 0¯
JH2 Q¯m I
−1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= log
∣∣∣∣∣∣I +
 ΛmQ¯m 0¯
0
¯
0
¯
 (I + J1Q¯m)−1 0¯
−JH2 Q¯m(I + J1Q¯m)−1 I
∣∣∣∣∣∣
= log
∣∣∣∣∣∣I +
 ΛmQ¯m(I + J1Q¯m)−1 0¯
0
¯
0
¯
∣∣∣∣∣∣
= log
∣∣∣∣∣∣
 I + ΛmQ¯m(I + J1Q¯m)−1 0¯
0
¯
I
∣∣∣∣∣∣
= log
∣∣I + ΛmQ¯m(I + J1Q¯m)−1∣∣
= log
∣∣I + (Λm + J1)Q¯m∣∣− log ∣∣I + J1Q¯m∣∣ = R(Q¯m). (81)
Using (81), the secrecy capacity is given by
Csec(Pt) = max
Q¯m0
¯
, Tr(Q¯m)=Pt
R(Q¯m) . (82)
Problem (82) shows that the secrecy capacity of a wiretap channel with HHH−GHG  0
¯
is equal
to the secrecy capacity of an equivalent wiretap channel with
HHeqHeq = Λm + J1 (83)
GHeqGeq = J1 , (84)
where Λm and J1 are respectively given by (76) and (80). It should also be noted that for the equivalent
channel, HHeqHeq −GHeqGeq = Λm  0¯. Thus, the optimal Q¯
∗
m can be computed using Theorem 2, as
long as the equivalent channel satisfies the second condition in Theorem 2. Finally, by substituting Q¯∗m
back into (79) we obtain
Q∗d = Ψ
 Q¯∗m 0¯
0
¯
0
¯
ΨH , (85)
which completes the proof.
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